Practice of politics revision

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# Parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential

## Questions

* How would you talk about different power balances between presidential and parliamentary, and how they affect outcomes? (Collection question)
* What examples are there for case studies?

## Essay titles

What is the difference between a presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary system? What other variables does the real-world operation of a regime depend on, besides those found in constitutions?

* 12T Why do parliamentary democracies last longer than presidential democracies?
* 13T Is presidentialism inherently more unstable than parliamentarism?
* 14T ‘Differences between presidential and parliamentary democracies are much less important for political outcomes than differences within parliamentary and presidential democracies respectively.’ Discuss.
* 15T Does distinguishing amongst regimes based on whether they are presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary tell us much about political outcomes?
* 16T Between a presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary regime, which one do you think is the best choice for a post-authoritarian, newly democratised state?
* 17T To what extent is semi-presidentialism a meaningful category?
* 17L‘Whether a system is presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary tells us more about how it works than what it produces.’ Discuss.
* 18T ‘The distinction between presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems provides useful conceptual clarity even though it fails to predict political outcomes.’ Discuss.
* 19L ‘Presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems explain why democracies survive, but not much else.’ Discuss.
* 19T Does the distinction among presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems explain any systematic differences across countries?
* 21L What is Duverger’s key contribution to the study of semi-presidentialism?
* 21T What are the comparative effects on democratisation of parliamentary and presidential systems?
* 21T Why are presidential democracies less durable than parliamentary democracies?
* 21T ‘Factors other than constitutions best explain the operation of parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential systems.’ Do you agree?

## Definitions

* **Presidential system**: one in which the government does not depend on a legislative majority to remain in power.
* **Semi-presidential system:** one in which the government depends on a legislative majority to remain in power, and the head of state is popularly elected for a fixed term.
  + **President-parliamentary:** the government is accountable to the president as well as the legislature
  + **Premier-presidential:** the government is only accountable to the legislature
* **Parliamentary system:** one in which the government depends on a legislative majority to remain in power, and the head of state is not popularly elected for a fixed term.
* **Stability**: government stability vs regime stability
* **Gamson’s law**: in parliamentary systems, cabinet portfolios are distributed in strict proportionality to the number of seats that each party contributes to the government’s legislative majority.
* **Minimal winning coalition:** coalition in which there are no parties that are not required for a legislative majority.
  + **Least minimal winning coalition:** the MWC with the fewest “surplus” seats over what is needed for a bare majority.
* **Connected coalition:** coalition in which the member parties are located directly next to each other in the policy space.

## Arguments

* **Conceptual utility**: yes, there are crisp boundaries; most disagreement is currently about utility of system rather than if countries are correctly placed
  + The semi-presidential group: Lijphart (2012) suggests they could be split up and subsumed into the other two
    - Premier-presidential regimes are very similar to parliamentary ones; president-parliamentary alternate between parliamentary and presidential depending on whether cohabitation or not
    - However, the very fact that alternation is possible is an important fact.
  + But, studying democracies in 1990s Europe, Amorim Neto and Strøm find that president-parliamentary countries are somewhere between presidential and parliamentary ones in terms of key stats e.g. partisan ministers, proportionality of cabinet posts
* **Differences in outcomes**: causal effect on proximate outcomes, but mechanisms for policy outcomes are dubious
  + **Government formation:** presidential regimes are more likely to be in a legislative minority and less likely to rule as a coalition than those in parliamentary regimes
    - We can explain why this would be true theoretically given executive-legislative relations and mutual confidence / majority support required in parliamentary
    - But likelihood of minority government in presidential systems depends on how policy-seeking politicians are, and the scope of executive powers
  + **Cabinet composition:** presidential cabinets tend to have more non-partisan ministers and a lower proportionality in the allocation of ministerial posts (not following Gamson’s law)
    - A minority president does not need to buy legislative backing from other parties in the same way that a minority prime minister would
    - But there’s a huge amount of within-group variation.
  + **Democratic longevity:** worse in presidential democracies
    - But young democracies – those most likely to have lapsed into undemocratic government – are almost exclusively presidential in South America and pluralist parliamentary in Eastern Europe
    - Suggests that there’s endogeneity in determining democratic type, so confounders for causal mechanism (Colomer 2006)
    - Also, the level of legislative factionalism matters – Mainwaring shows that two-party presidential systems do OK.
  + **Can’t even help with predicting basic institutional features**
    - A country’s democratic type is less useful than simply knowing when and where its constitution was written in predicting e.g. whether the executive has powers to make decrees and vetoes (Cheibub et al 2014)
    - So why think it would help with political outcomes downstream of legislative-executive relations?
  + **Doesn’t tell us much about outcomes**
    - There are differences in outcomes between the average presidential system and the average parliamentary system
    - But within-type variation means that we can’t draw useful inferences about the political outcomes in a particular country on the basis of its regime type.
* **Authoritarian backsliding**
  + Linz, competing claims for legitimacy in presidential systems (legislature vs executive)
  + Legislative ineffectiveness and deadlock
  + Separate survival can magnify conflict
* **Accountability and chains of representation** (Strøm, 2003)
  + Harder to identify who is responsible when there are coalitions in parliamentary systems. But this can also happen due to competing claims to legitimacy in presidential systems. So moral hazard in both.
  + Also, adverse selection in presidential systems where you may get inexperienced executive.
  + Empirically, voters attribute more responsibility to the executive in presidential systems than parliamentary. So accountability may be stronger. (Samuels and Hellwig)

## Key thinkers

* **Linz (1990) – Perils of Presidentialism**
  + But selection bias, most taken from Lat Am which all democratised in second wave
* **Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010)**
  + Give a definition of presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential, which was first presented in Alvarez et al. (1996).
* **Shugart and Carey (1992)**
  + Two types of semi-presidential system: president-parliamentary and premier-presidential
  + Important book on separation of powers
* **Tsebelis (2002) – Veto Players**
  + Argues that institutional differences are less important than behavioural ones
* **Cox and McCubbins (2001)**
  + The separate survival in presidential systems means that they are more resolute and less decisive
* **Mainwaring – “difficult combination” of presidentialism and multiparty systems**
  + Because there’s high legislative fragmentation, leading to high probability of deadlock
* **Stepan and Skach – reconciliation vs antagonism**
  + Mutual dependence in parliamentary system forces executive-legislative relations to be more cordial

## Examples

* Premier-presidential systems
  + Ireland, Portugal, Armenia, Mali, Mongolia
* President-parliamentary systems
  + France & Ukraine (cohabitation), Taiwan, Senegal
* Government instability doesn’t necessarily mean inexperienced ministers
  + Postwar Italy (parliamentary system) was characterized by endemic cabinet instability. Average cabinet duration was less than a year.
  + But the Christian Democratic Party was in power continuously from 1948-1992.
* The French Fourth Republic had very high instability
  + In just 12 years, it had twenty-four different governments and sixteen different prime ministers
  + Due to the proportionality of electoral system

## Statistics

* Government formation
  + When no party has absolute majority, there’s minority government 68% of the time in presidential, whereas only 38% in parliamentary (Cheibub et al, 2004)
  + Coalition government results from those circumstances 30% less often in presidential systems (Cheibub et al, 2004)
* Cabinet composition
  + 3% non-partisan ministers in parliamentary (s.d. 10%), 29% in presidential (s.d. 29%) (Neto and Samuels 2010)
* Democratic success
  + For non-OECD countries in 1973-89, the democratic survival rate for parliamentary regimes was 60%, triple that of presidential ones. Differences even when adjusting for differences in economic and technological development (Stepan & Skach 1993)
  + None of the thirty-six countries that adopted presidentialism after WW2 managed to sustain democracy during the 1980s (Stepan & Skach 1993).
  + Probability of sustaining democracy for a 25-year period between 1945 and 1992 is similar between two-party presidential regimes, at 0.50, as parliamentary regimes at 0.57 (Mainwaring). This holds when controlling for wealth, oil production, and growth (Clark et al.)

# Majoritarian and consensus systems

## Questions

* How do you define polarisation? What endogeneity explanations may there be for far-right parties in consensus systems? What empirical evidence is there?

## Essay titles

What claims have been made about the merits and defects of so-called majoritarian and consensus democracies, and how have these claims been tested in scholarly research?

21T 20. How does the electoral system influence the consensus or majoritarian disposition of a democracy?

19L 22. Can the majoritarian vs consensus distinction explain variation in political outcomes?

19T 5. To what extent does the majoritarian vs consensus distinction adequately explain variation in political outcomes?

17L 14. Are majoritarian systems more efficient than consensus ones?

16L 20. ‘If consensus democracies have more veto players than majoritarian democracies, any polity should lean towards a majoritarian ideal.’ Discuss.

16T 20. “Consensus democracies are “gentler” than majoritarian democracies but less efficient in policy making.” Discuss.

15T 14. ‘So-called “consensus democracies” may be kinder and gentler, but this has little to do with their institutional design.’ Discuss.

## Arguments

* Conceptual validity
  + See Colomer from Week 1
* Gentler
  + Political satisfaction with the way democracy works is more widely and evenly distributed in pluralistic regimes than in majoritarian ones (Anderson and Guillory 1997); more likely to contain median voter’s opinion.

## Notes

* Not evidence for consensus being gentler, but they do tend to be less efficient in policymaking, where “efficiency” is understood to mean the speed and ease with which legislation is passed.
* Definitions – about distribution of decision-making power
  + Simply speaking, countries where power is concentrated with the majority are majoritarian, whereas those where power is spread out as much as possible are consensus (Lijphart 2012)
  + Can split up into two sub-components which separately capture the effects on distribution of power from constitutional design (federal-unity; de jure) and from actual political outcomes (executive-parties dimensions; de facto).
  + Classification of individual countries as consensus or majoritarian is generally uncontroversial; critics focus on relevance & generalisability
* Lower levels of violence and instability in consensus
  + Moving in the consensus direction along the executive-parties dimension has a positive effect on political stability and negative effect on deaths from domestic terrorism
  + But bad coding of terrorism incidents distorts the difference which is no longer statistically significant when corrected (Bogaads 2020)
  + Also, (perhaps unintentional) selective exclusion of “extreme outliers” like the UK which reinforce the result that Lijphart argues for
* The two dimensions of major/consens are not empirically or even theoretically very satisfying
  + Lijphart claims that consociationalism helps prevent civil unrest by guaranteeing representation for minorities
  + But theoretically, perhaps federalism increases communal violence by formalising sectarianism within each region, and weakening national unity
    - Empirically it increases the amount of protest that minorities engage in (Clark et al)
  + Better to look at veto players and collective vs competitive points (veto players are present in the same institution or separate ones)
    - Collective points cope better in divided societies as produce more compromise and less deadlock (Bogaards 2017)
    - Cuts across consensus/majoritarian: e.g. PR is collective but federalism competitive. So the executive-parties and unitary-federal dimensions can come apart
* Proportional representation can make things gentler
  + Less distortionary than SMDP systems, so produces parliaments closer to the median voter
  + And fewer knife-edge cases where political parties are strongly incentivised to use underhand tactics such as funnelling money into marginal constituencies to gain victory in a winner-takes-all contest
* Consensus democracies are less decisive at policymaking, because of the larger number of veto players in their legislatures (Tsebelis)
  + Higher resoluteness but lower responsiveness; this could explain growth of far-right
* Lijphart argues better macroeconomic and environmental performance in consensus
  + But in terms of economy, the largest effect for consensus is due to central bank independence and corporatist interest groups
    - But CB independence is now found in most advanced economies, and the corporatism is less a political feature than an economic one (Roller 2005)
    - It was mentioned in one article I read, which references Anderson 2001. I think the argument was that corporatism is aggregating, while all other consensus institutions are disaggregating. Also it has weaker correlations the other factors
    - So suggests that the association is an artifact and not actually caused by consensus democracy’s superior qualities
  + Also in terms of environment, Poloni-Staudinger (2008)
    - Consensus and majoritarian basically indistinguishable in terms of environmental taxes and nuclear energy
* Also, even according to Lijphart himself the federal-unity dimension has “extremely weak and statistically insignificant” associations with the dependent variables
  + And the relationship fails to replicate in 19 post-Soviet Eastern Europe in terms of factor analysis (Fortin), and also Asia & southern Africa (Borman)
* Whilst many ethnically divided European countries which adopted consociational models have now integrated their minorities effectively, that doesn’t mean
  + (a) that the consensus model caused this,
  + or the much stronger assertion (b) that currently divided societies would similarly become more peaceful if they adopted the model.

# Democracy and authoritarianism

## Titles

Can we draw a sharp distinction between regimes that are democratic and those that are not? If so, what are the criteria? If not, why not?

21L 15. ‘The boundary between democratic and non-democratic is sometimes a blurred and imperfect one.’ Discuss.

## Questions

* Why would dominant party dictatorships buy off minority factions, but not personalistic dictatorships?

## Notes

* You can draw a sharp boundary if you want to, but that doesn’t mean it’s useful or theoretically valid
  + Taking a dichotomous approach to classifying democracies and non-democracies is more prone to bias and definitional sensitivity than when continuous measures are used.
  + Distinguishing between democratic and non-democratic regimes is helpful as it allows academics to test hypotheses about the effects that having characteristics associated with democracy has on a country, and then to make predictions and recommendations from the evidence-based models which emerge.
* Minimalist approaches
  + Focussing on *de jure* features of the procedure by which governments are selected in a given country.
  + Democracy-Dictatorship (Cheibub et al 2010): a country is democratic only if it has a multiparty system with an elected legislature and chief executive, and in which there has been a previous transfer of power
    - The transfer of power condition is included to avoid Type I errors (i.e. calling countries where the incumbent would refuse to give up power if they were to lose an election democratic), yet this means that some pluralist nations such as Singapore, and Botswana, are categorised as dictatorships
    - This wrinkle is one initial indication of the arbitrariness of binary classification.
  + You can have richer procedural definitions though, e.g. Dahl; Polity IV, V-Dem
    - Polity IV uses aggregation rules that you could disagree with. Dahl says democracy is multidimensional whereas Polity rolls it all into a single scalar.
* Others are more substantive, and take into account the *de facto* context in a nation, such as citizens’ freedom of speech and assembly
  + But these are not very useful as they’re measuring the very outcomes that we might try to use them to explain. Also extremely vulnerable to coder bias, etc.
* Sartori calls the idea of continuous democracy “stultifying” as there’s “no zero point”
  + Maybe there is a difference in kind
  + But this is empirically invalidated by the existence of electoral authoritarian regimes
  + Levitsky and Way (2002) – African and Eastern European countries persistently quite undemocratic
    - So they’re not transitioning between the two “bounded wholes”
  + Also theoretically implausible
    - Even if you argue that the components of democracy are complementary and not substitutive, claiming that there’s a sharp distinction means that you’re committing yourself to saying that there is some threshold of civil liberties at which the electoral arena suddenly switches from being uncompetitive to competitive, a conceptually unsatisfactory discontinuity
* Also, when assessments of democraticness are done, we see countries over the full range of values
  + An analogy with age can help us to understand why Dahl’s conception of polyarchy (1971) is appropriate
    - And continuous measures need not have a zero point: consider it as being over the open interval , where the two extremes are the idealised, but non-actual, forms of dictatorship and polyarchy respectively
* At a practical level, taking a binary indicator approach prevents precise explanations and predictions from being made about outcomes
  + If you plot a range of welfare measures against level of democracy, we see that dictatorships tend to have a larger amount of variation within outcomes, but are not on average substantially different to the typical democracy
    - there are dictatorships across the full range of wellbeing indicators
    - producing a dichotomous classification is an arbitrary exercise in choosing where to position the vertical line dividing democracies and dictatorships
  + Instead, we should plot inclusion and contestation on two separate, quantitative axes (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003)
    - This allows much better statistical conclusions to be drawn
    - Selectorate theory is a way of operationalising this: contestation is ratio W/S, and inclusion is value S. Helps explain variation in dictatorships. Data on p401 in Principles
* Democracy is not a discrete quality that countries either possess or do not, but rather an ideal which states fulfil to varying extents.
  + As a result, employing a binary indicator to quantify this continuous concept will thus inevitably reduce the resolution of our measurements and demand the introduction of subjective cut-off points
* **Modernisation theory**:
  + Lipset: economic development will help both (a) the emergence of democracy and (b) the survival of democracy
  + Przeworski et al.: almost all countries with GDP per capita > $8,000 are democratic, only 12% < $1,500 are.
    - Argues that wealth increases chance of democratic survival, but not emergence
    - In democratic countries which are wealthy, people have more to lose from the gamble of switching to dictatorship
    - The big difference with modernisation theory is (a) the frequency of regime transitions in general [expects less likely in richer countries] and (b) the effect of increased income on transitions to democracy in particular [expect no effect]
    - But not supported by their own evidence, because empirically democratic transitions become much more likely with income: e.g. the probability of becoming democratic is six times larger than the probability of becoming dictatorial when GDP per capita is greater than $6,000
  + Theoretical causal mechanism
    - Underlying changes to social structure, i.e. increased reliance on human capital and liquid assets, mean that democracy is unavoidable
    - Because the state has to pay attention to the owners of liquid assets, since they’ll leave the country if not. So it shifts the power balance between predatory state and citizens.
    - Democracy as a check on state power can also help with credible commitment issues: shows that the government won’t just not repay debts, etc, when it borrows money from people
    - Limited government in early modern Europe was more likely to arise in polities in which the Crown was dependent on elites with mobile assets
    - Also, lots of resource wealth allows for revenue without taxation.
* **Culture**
  + Cultural modernization theory: economic development produces cultural change that leads to democratization. Inglehart
  + Or, maybe reversed causality: economic development leads to democratization, which, in turn, leads to cultural change
  + Clark et al show that once wealth is controlled for, there’s no statistically significant relationship between a country being majority-Muslim and it being non-democratic. However, one could argue that this is a bad control.
* **What might make democracies better?**
  + Property rights (e.g. compare early modern England with France – much faster economic growth. Cf Olson and roving bandits etc)
    - But Barro shows democracy doesn’t necessarily mean better rule of law. For example, look at Malaysia, Hong Kong, Gulf states. And on the other side, Greece and South Africa
  + Counterargument: elites are more likely to save i.e. invest, and in dictatorships they have more wealth, so growth is better (de Schweinitz, Galenson)
    - But this assumes dictators care more about the future than democratic leaders
  + Empirically: democracy appears to be sufficient for ensuring some degree of success in these various areas of material well being, but it is obviously not necessary for success
* **Variation in dictatorships**:
  + Can distinguish based on how the leader comes to power and maintains their power

A diagram of political party

Description automatically generated

* + Monarchies – most stable
    - Examples: Kuwait, Qatar, Swaziland
  + Civilian – worst performance. W and W/S are both small.
    - Examples: China, Zimbabwe
    - Personalistic dictatorships may engage in absurd cults of personality. It’s a way to address the dictator’s dilemma: he relies on repression to stay in power, but this repression creates incentives for everyone to falsify their preferences so that the dictator never knows his true level of societal support. Accepting the cult of personality is a costly, credible signal that you do support them.
    - Dominant-party dictatorships have small winning coalitions and large selectorates, so provide private rewards to their coalition and lead to lots of corruption
    - Party members want to hold office, and the best way to do that is remaining united. So minority factions may be bought off and co-opted.
    - Whereas in personalistic dictatorships, it is very difficult for members of the leader’s faction to successfully defect, and so minorities don’t need to be bought off much.
    - Personalistic dictatorships often have a very large repressive state. And a personalistic dictator often deliberately party institutions so that they cannot act as a power base for a potential rival.
  + Military dictatorships – OK performance but least stable. W is small but W/S is large
    - 29.1 percent of military dictatorships between 1946 and 1996 ended with democratic transitions, while only 15.6 percent of civilian dictatorships and 4.5 percent of monarchies did (Geddes)
    - Because the military has the guns, it can step away from politics with a credible threat of re-taking over if things don’t go its way.
    - So the military can negotiate a transfer of power and ensure what it cares about – the unity and efficacy of the military – is protected
    - Since 1991, 75% of military coups have held elections within 5 years, vs only 25% before then. This might be because of much more international pressure
  + Selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al)
    - In order to remain in power, rulers *must*govern badly in countries with a small winning coalition and small selectorate.
    - Consider Leopold II (1835–1909), who was king of Belgium (large W, large W/S) and ruler of the Congo Free State (small W, small W/S).
    - There is a strong loyalty norm in small W/S systems and a weak loyalty norm in large W/S systems (because the members of the winning coalition are fairly likely to still be members if someone else were in power). When there’s a weaker loyalty norm, the leader has to distribute more goods to supporters in order to maintain their support
    - Also, small W systems (dictatorships) will tend to use private goods to stay in power, whereas leaders in large W systems (democracies) will primarily use public goods, because it’s too expensive to give private goods to all those in W
* **Why would autocrats hold elections?**
  + About half of the legislative and presidential elections that occurred in the world between 1946 and 2000 actually took place in dictatorships (Golder)
    - The only country that has held no post-war elections at all (including at the municipal level) is Brunei
  + Often these elections may be a complete charade. For example, in Russia or Iran where opposition leaders are killed or prohibited from running
  + Also, electoral manipulation is often even when elections are *not* close. This is to signal party strength and the futility of defecting.
  + Lust-Okar and Jamal argue electoral system may depend on dictatorship type. Supported empirically in Middle East
    - Dominant-party may adopt majoritarian systems
    - Monarchies may want proportional, so there’s no competing source of legitimacy
  + Gandhi and Lust-Okar give five reasons:
    - They’re an efficient way of co-opting elites. They deal with how to allocate cushy jobs etc amongst members of the regime.
    - Co-opt opposition groups by affording them very limited power and a stake in maintaining the status quo. By allowing only some opposition groups to compete, keeps the enemy divided.
    - Provides some information to leaders about their level of support. And in China, municipal elections help identify useless local leaders.
    - Legitimacy at home and abroad
    - A controlled channel for dissent, e.g. by allowing voters to abstain or spoil their ballots

# State capacity

## Questions

* How can we use Latin America and Africa as examples?

## Titles

What is state strength? What determines how strong a state is?

21T 14. ‘Monopoly on the legitimate use of violence is outmoded as the key indicator of state strength.’ Discuss.

## Notes

* Variations in state capacity can be explained by the presence and absence of institutions, the differences in which can in turn be ascribed to a combination of historical and social factors – notably developments in war-making technologies, colonial status, and ethnic polarisation.
  + Regime type and economic growth are not direct determinants of state capacity, and in the case of economic performance, may be more influenced by state capacity than the other way round.
* Definitions
  + State capacity is linked to the extent to which government can extract taxes and monopolise violence throughout its territory (also informational capacity)
  + I conceptualise state capacity as the ability of the state to successfully implement its desired policies, following Lindvall and Teorell (2016)
    - We want to distinguish between autonomy (i.e. regime type) and capacity
    - it is theoretically possible for an autocratic state to have high capacity whilst providing far below the optimal level of public goods
  + The dimensions of coercive, financial, and judicial capacity are very highly correlated (Spruyt 2009)
* Institutions
  + Acemoğlu et al. (2001) use instrumental variable of settler mortality to show link between early institutions and current ones, and also current ones with financial & legal capacity
    - There’s no residual variation in outcomes which can be explained by other factors like climate, natural resources, or racial composition
  + There are also spillover effects from institutions in neighbouring regions: Columbia study by Acemoğlu et al. (2015)
* What explains variations in institutions?
  + Historical military developments, the growth of capitalist democracy, and ethno-cultural factors. But mostly the first and third.
* War-making in early modern Europe
  + New military technologies such as gunpowder and fortifications raised the fixed costs associated with maintaining a capacity for coercion, causing national leaders to gain a competitive advantage over regional ones (Spruyt 2009)
    - Increasing returns to violence (Olson 1993)
  + Empirical data showing a strong positive correlation between financial capacity and length of time a state spent at war over its history (Belsey & Persson 2009)
  + Military technology and external conflict 🡪 emergence of state-level institution 🡪 present institutions 🡪 capacity.
* Political & economic transformation
  + There is no relationship between per-capita income and outbreak of civil war (an indicator of low state capacity) once a time-invariant term for each country is accounted for (Bates 2008), highlighting instead the importance of institutional differences
  + Numerous undemocratic yet but high-capacity states which are able to effectively implement their desired policies – for instance, East Asian autocracies like China (Khemani 2019).
  + U-shaped relationship between level of democracy and state capacity (Bates 2008)
    - Game theory explains this (Olson 1993): longevity of dynastic autocracies creates an incentive for rulers to develop lasting institutions for state capacity, something which is absent in young and unstable democracies
  + These present a substantial challenge the notion that democratisation determines increases in state capacity, as opposed to incidentally accompanied it in early modern Europe
* Ethnic composition
  + Homogeneity of Britain as compared to France, Spain and Poland as a key factor in its ability to build financial capacity faster than rival kingdoms (Johnson & Koyama 2017)
  + From a game-theoretic perspective, small-scale autocracy remains feasible despite military tech develops if there are geographically discrete ethnic groups (Olson 1993)
  + Large ethnic divisions in a country can nullify the effect that war-making has on increasing state capacity (Walter and Emmenegger 2022)
* Conclusion: observed variations in state capacity are best described empirically by the historic presence and absence of institutions within states
  + This doesn’t change if you use a different definition of capacity because there’s very strong complementarity between financial/judicial/etc features of states
  + Ethnic homogeneity is empirically correlated with greater current state capacity, and there are game-theoretic reasons to think that different demographic qualities would lead to variation in institution formation
  + Democracy isn’t necessary or sufficient so can’t use regime type to explain variations in state capacity
  + Two-way causality between state capacity and economic outcomes

# Social movements [blank]

# Voter behaviour [blank]

## Titles

Do voters still exhibit stable links to established parties in contemporary democracies, and if not why not?

# Party systems [blank]

## Titles

a) What are the sociological and institutional determinants of party systems? What are the major weaknesses of these explanations?

b) To what extent are party systems in developing world democracies based on social cleavages?

21L 17. Discuss the ways in which dealignment shapes party competition.